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I. INTRODUCTION
Few called them a politician’s empty promises when the President of the
Republic of Korea announced an ambitious package of pledges to implement
the sustainable development goals declared by the unanimity of the United
Nations (UN) General Assembly on September 26, 2016. Not many, either,
among the largest crowd of heads of state and government in the history of
environmental conferences in attendance during the high-level meeting,
would have dwelled on the reasons behind their boundless trust in her
pledges being realized. This despite the popular theory that the adoption of a
resolution, which contains those goals, is merely recommendatory in nature
and thus does not legally guarantee compliance by participant states.1
Beginning with the UN Conference on Human Environment (Stockholm
Conference) in 1972, the international community has convened under the
auspices of the UN for similar gatherings: the UN Conference on
Environment and Development (Rio Conference) in 1992, the World Summit
on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg Summit) in 2002, the UN
Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in 2012, and the
aforementioned summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development
agenda (Sustainable Development Summit).2 They called a great deal of
public attention to the issues of worldwide environmental degradation and
became an important part of the human struggle to protect, conserve, and
enhance the Earth’s environment. At the center of the immense changes in
our thoughts and behaviors that this unprecedented movement brought about

1

Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on Customary
International Law, 73 PROC. OF THE AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 301 (1979) (General Assembly
lacks legislative powers—Resolutions are not binding on member states or in international
law at large).
2
The UN held seminal environmental conferences on a vicennial basis: the Stockholm
Conference, the Rio Conference, and Rio+20. In between, there were conferences aimed at a
ten-year review of the previous vicennial conferences: the session of a special character and
tenth session of the Governing Council of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP)
(Nairobi Summit) in 1982 and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg
Summit) in 2002. Most recently, in September 2015, a high-level meeting, Sustainable
Development Summit, was convened at the UN Headquarters in New York and adopted an
outcome document titled conferences: the session of a special character and tenth session of
the Governing Council of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) (Nairobi Summit) in
1982 Development (Johannesburg Summit) in 2002. Most recently in September 2015, a
high-level meeting (Sustainable Development Summit) was convened at the UN Headquarters
in New York and adopted an outcome document titled “Transforming our world: the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development.” There could be additions to this list, especially those
with a specialized focus, but these may be the most important and influential contemporary
UN environmental conferences with a general scope.
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lies the normative power derived from the outcome principles of those
conferences.
This Article seeks the origin of this normative power and examines the
legal status of the outcome principles of these historic UN environmental
conferences. In the process, what have typically been regarded as “soft law
principles” will prove to be virtually indistinguishable from the general
principles of law that the traditional scholarship recognizes as a source of
international law. This may not be true for all soft law instruments, but is
rather a precise conclusion in the case of soft law principles.3 So far, few
have identified the possibility that soft law principles are indeed a source of
international law under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). The author’s contention would be, however, that in
international law the argument for soft law principles as law and the
argument for hard law principles as law are the same. Therefore, if the
former succeeds, the latter should succeed, too; in case either argument is not
successful, in fact both fail in similar ways. The author will also elaborate
the conditions to fortify this novel theoretical conclusion, drawing directly
from the practice of the major UN environmental conferences that have
produced soft law principles. Such jurisprudential inquiry will touch upon
the fundamental questions of international law, which need to be answered
further to understand the scope and degree of influences that these outcomes
principles had upon the evolution of international environmental law and
governance.
II. FORMS OF THE OUTCOMES OF UN ENVIRONMENTAL CONFERENCES
International conferences convened under the auspices of the UN have
produced outcomes in various forms of documents bearing different legal
and political implications.4 For instance, the UN diplomatic conference of
3
Scholars are rethinking principles in international law. In a recent meeting, Mathias
Forteau, French member of the UN International Law Commission (ILC) held a briefing
before the UN member states that the Commission will decide in the upcoming session
whether to include principles as one of their next quinquennial topics. See Mathias Forteau,
Member, Int’l Law Comm’n, Briefing on the Work of the International Law Commission
(June 23, 2016).
4
In regard to the various types of outcomes of UN conferences, see generally HENRY G.
SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN
DIVERSITY (5th rev. ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) (1972); HANNA BOKOR-SZEGŐ,
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION (North-Holland Pub. Co.
1978); BENEDETTO CONFORTI & CARLO FOCARELLI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS (4th rev. ed., Martinus Nijhoff 2010) (1996); Paul Szasz, General Law-making
Process, in 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 35-108 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C.
Joyner eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995); Volker Rittberger, Conferences in UNITED
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plenipotentiaries held in Rome from June 15 to July 17, 1998 concluded the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a treaty establishing the
first permanent international criminal court, which is recognized as a source
of international law in a strict sense.5 On the other hand, UN Conferences on
the Standardization of Geographical Names, which have been convened
every five years since 1967, produced resolutions containing standards in the
field of nomenclature that are merely technical and recommendatory in
nature.6 There are also UN conferences, which failed to produce a
meaningful outcome.7 For instance, the UN Conference on Territorial
Asylum held in Geneva from January 10 to February 4, 1977 was initially
expected to produce an international convention. However, participants
could not reach a consensus and ended up only with the record of
proceedings in a report.8 Conferences not just by the UN, but by other
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations have gone through
the congruent path with similarly varied outcomes.9
NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE 160–68 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Christiane Philipp eds.
Martinus Nijhoff, 1995); Robbie Sabel, Conferences and Congresses, International, in MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (July 2008); Christine Chinkin & Ina
Gätzschmann, Summit Meetings, MAX P LANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Mar. 2013).
5
For more examples of UN conferences leading to the conclusion of well-known treaties,
see United Nations Diplomatic Conferences, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,
http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).
6
See generally U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Resolutions Adopted at the Nine
UNCSGNs: 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1998, 2002, 2007, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.101/INF/6 (July 13, 2012).
7
It is not easy to identify a failed conference since its official announcement almost
always tends to be positive. Nonetheless, if the conference could not produce a planned
outcome, it could be evaluated as a failure at least to that extent. See Interview with
Anonymous*, Senior Legal Officer, U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 9,
2015). *The name of the interviewee has been omitted deliberately.
8
See Report of the U.N. Conference on Territorial Asylum, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.78/12
(Apr. 21, 1977). There are other similar examples. The Second UN Conference on the Law
of the Sea held in Geneva on March 17 to April 26, 1960 considered the topic of the “breadth
of the territorial sea and fishery limits,” the resolution of which participants in the First
Conference could not agree upon. The Second Conference failed again to reach a consensus,
and discussions on the topic were deferred until the Third Conference was convened thirteen
years later. See Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1960, U.N. OFFICE
OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea-1960/lawofthesea1960.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).
9
For instance, the Hague Conference on Private International Law has produced about
forty-five conventions and other forms of legal instruments, including discussions on the topic
were defensidered the topic of the extent.,” which was adopted after ten years’ negotiation.
See Hague Conference on Private In’l Law, Principles of Choice of Law International
Commercial Contracts (Mar. 19, 2015), https://assets.hchh.net/docs/5da3ed47-f54d-4c43aaef-5eafc7c1f2a1.pdf. Some of the conferences were fruitful and others were not throughout
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Among the variations, seminal international environmental conferences
organized under the auspices of the UN often concluded in two types of
outcomes: a declaration and a plan of action or implementation. For
example, participants in the Stockholm Conference addressed their
conviction about the promotion of the environment in the Declaration of the
UN Conference on the Human Environment10 and adopted the Action Plan
for the Human Environment.11 Likewise, those in the Rio Conference agreed
upon the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development on the one
hand12 and Agenda 21 on the other.13 The Johannesburg Summit also
adopted both the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development14
and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable
Development.15 Though slightly divergent from these examples, Rio+20 and
the Sustainable Development Summit combined these two outcomes into one
document while substantively keeping them separate within the document.16
its history since the first meeting in 1893. Meetings of the International Conference of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent also contributed in similar ways to setting standards in
humanitarian affairs and laws, including their guidelines and codes of conduct, some of which
proved to be part of customary international law in the field.
10
The Declaration contains twenty-six principles following seven preambular paragraphs.
See Conference Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
11
The Action Plan suggests a framework for environmental action with 109
recommendations covering diverse areas of concern. See U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment, Action Plan for the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1
(June 1973).
12
The Declaration has twenty-seven principles with five preambular paragraphs. See U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (1993) [hereinafter Rio
Declaration].
13
Agenda 21 is a 473-page document with extensive sets of action plans composed of forty
chapters and as many as 1414 paragraphs. See U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex II (1993).
14
The Declaration is composed of thirty-seven paragraphs. See World Summit on
Sustainable Development, Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.199/20, 1–5 (2002).
15
The Plan of Implementation provides 11 chapters and 190 paragraphs. See World
Summit on Sustainable Development, Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on
Sustainable Development, res. 2, annex, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (Sept. 4, 2002).
16
The General Assembly decided to have the outcome of Rio+20 in one concise document.
See G.A. Res. 64/236, para. 20(b) (Mar. 31, 2010). It is partly because the previous outcome
in two types of documents was too voluminous to make it a convenient guide in practice. See
Woong Kyu Sung, Core Issues in International Sustainable Development: Analysis of Shifting
Priorities at U.N. Environmental Conferences, 44 ELR 10574, 10575 n.7 (2014). However,
the Rio+20 outcome document is substantively similar and formally analogous with the
outcomes of other UN environmental conferences. More specifically, among the six chapters,
the former four chapters (paragraphs similar and formally analogous with the outcomes of
other UN environmental conferences. More specifically, among the six chapters, the former
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Some major UN environmental conferences furnished a substantial
portion of their outcome in the form of principles. For instance, the
Stockholm Conference provides twenty-six principles and the Rio
Conference provides twenty-seven principles. Outcomes from other major
UN environmental conferences also tend to include, though only
substantively, a bundle of principles as is the case with other soft law
instruments in various formats that purport to lay down principles.17 For
example, although Rio+20 did not explicitly provide paragraphs titled
“principles,” the conference introduced in its outcome a number of principles
to promote what is called the “green economy,” a new concept of sustainable
development.18 In the case of the Sustainable Development Summit, the
outcome declaration includes a subsection titled “Our shared principles and
commitments” that merely recalls several past conferences and outcomes in
which important principles were announced.19 The Summit set out, instead,
seventeen goals to be achieved, which strongly imply a set of principles.20
III. CONTEXT OF OUTCOME PRINCIPLES
What is the importance of these outcome principles in international law?
How does it relate to the identical terminology found in the ICJ Statute that
the traditional scholarship considers as an applicable law?

four chapters (paragraphs 1–103) may substantively comprise a declaration. The latter two
chapters (paragraphs 104–283) contain provisions about a framework for action, follow-up
plans, and means of implementation. See id. at 10575–76. The outcome of the Sustainable
Development Summit is somewhat complex. It contains a section (paragraphs 1–53), which
comes after a preamble, with the express title “Declaration” and towards the end of this
section there are two subsections with the titles “Means of implementation” and “Follow-up
and review” respectively. In addition, the outcome document has other separate sections at its
very end entitled “Means of implementation and the Global Partnership” and “Follow-up and
review.” Between the Declaration and the latter two sections, there is a portion dedicated to
listing “Sustainable Development Goals and targets.” See G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming our
world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Sept. 25, 2015). The Nairobi Summit
reached a consensus on the declaration only. See U.N. Env’t Programme Governing Council
on its Session of a Special Character and Tenth Session, Nairobi Declaration, U.N. Doc.
A/37/25, annex II (1982).
17
Christine Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International
Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 851 (1989).
18
See Sung, supra note 16, at 10576.
19
G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 16, paras. 10–13.
20
G.A. Red. 70/1, supra note 16, paras. 18–38.
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A. Jurisprudential Nature of Principles
Principle is a term that is difficult to define though it has been frequently
used in diverse contexts, including in the outcome of the major UN
environmental conferences as shown above.21 To avoid stipulating the
definition of the term for selective purposes, Ronald M. Dworkin suggested a
negative approach.22 His definition centers on a categorical comparison of
the principle with two other legal standards: namely, “value” on the one hand
and “rule” on the other. This method is very much conducive to grasping the
concept and function of principles and clarifying their jurisprudential
significance, which has since been followed by many scholars. Simply put,
value is a more abstract concept and rule is a more concrete one, relative to
the principle.23 The value is an expression of the eventual goal that a group
or society aspires to attain in a particular field.24 On the other hand, the rule
describes specific types of conduct that are either required or prohibited and
thus creates clearly delimited rights and obligations.25
The legal status of a principle lies in-between. Principles suggest a
normative strategy to pursue relevant values and the values provide a
theoretical basis and moral support to the principles.26 On the other hand,
principles denote what a set of rules have in common and the rules find their
abundant meaning in the principles.27 In this way, a set of norms have
developed over time from values to principles and to rules, or vice versa. Of
course, the distinction between the three concepts is more like an orientation
and approximation rather than a clear division or separation. In certain
contexts, principles are treated closer to values, and when necessary, they are
directly applicable to actual cases just as rules are.28 Despite the limited
21
Joaquín R.-Toubes Muñiz, Legal Principles and Legal Theory, 10 RATIO JURIS 267, 269
(1997).
22
Id.; see also TRUDY GOVIER, PRACTICAL STUDY OF ARGUMENT 76–77 (Enhanced 7th ed.,
Wadsworth Pub. Co. 2014) (1985).
23
Jonathan Verschuuren, Sustainable Development and the Nature of Environmental Legal
Principles, 9 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC L.J., May 2006, at 209, 211, http://www.nwu.ac.
za/p-per/volume-9-2006-no-1-1 (defining the principle and explaining its legal significance).
24
Id. at 214.
25
Jaye Ellis, Sustainable Development as a Legal Principle: A Rhetorical Analysis, in 2
SELECTED PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 642, 643 (Hélène
Ruiz Fabri et al. eds., Hart Pub. 2010); see also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS 112 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995).
26
Verschuuren, supra note 23, at 212–a.
27
Id. at 237–42.
28
Id.; see also Philippe Sands, International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development:
Emerging Legal Principles, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 53, 54
(Winfried Lang ed., Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff 1995).
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international recognition thus far,29 principles have played a central role
mediating and bridging of the gap between an abstract value and concrete
rules.30
For example, the principles of environmental law addressing human
dependence on the environment have served the values promoting nature’s
anthropogenic virtue and utility. To properly interpret rules realizing the
liability and compensation for environmental damage, we may have to revisit
the principle of just distribution of environmental costs and that of common
but differentiated responsibilities. In both ways, principles have given
deeper meaning and flexibility to other normative sources and enable a legal
system to accommodate emerging trends and recent scientific development
as well as particular circumstances so that over time and through these
processes an international environmental legal regime could become
established.31 In this way, the normative power flowing from the outcome
principles is important to understand the dynamics of the whole system of
law that the UN environmental conferences were to develop for effective
global environmental governance.
B. Type of Soft Law Possessing Stronger Normative Power
There has not been much academic focus on the principles, particularly
when this important normative concept is found in extralegal or paralegal
international instruments, including the outcome of the UN environmental
conferences. On the other hand, scholars have argued for and against the
legal value of similar instruments more generally, and their arguments
contributed to the creation of a new legal category that helps explain those
apparently abnormal international instruments:
Social norms of varying character and relevance influence
the behaviour and decisions of actors participating in
international relations. As far as their binding quality is
29

International courts or tribunals delivered few judgments that manifest the distinction of
principles from values or rules. After the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,
several Member States, including the United States, persistently argued against the inclusion
of relevant principles in an article of the Convention. Even the World Commission on
Environment and Development, which officially defined the term “sustainable development”
and tried to mainstream it at the international level, omitted addressing the question of the
legal status of principles related to environmental protection and sustainable development in
its seminal report titled “Our Common Future.” See Verschuuren, supra note 23, at 210–11.
30
Id. at 251.
31
Thomas A. Mensah, Soft Law: A Fresh Look at an Old Mechanism, 38 ENVTL. POL’Y &
L. 50, 51–52 (2008).
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concerned, such social norms range from purely moral or
political commitments to strictly legal ones. Yet between these
fairly clear cut categories exists a wide range of other rules, the
legally binding character of which has been deliberately and
sometimes explicitly denied by their drafters, but which
nevertheless cannot be considered mere moral or political
directives.32
Such instruments and norms therein are often called “soft law.” There
being various types of soft law, a declaration that embodies the principles
may be among the most formal sort. Of course, there could be objections to
this statement since it is said that an international conference produces the
declaration as an outcome of the work, especially when it lacks the will and
power to adopt binding measures.33 Nonetheless, one thing is clear that the
international community has been very careful in the choice of title for a
legal instrument, and the term “declaration” was put in only if the instrument
contained principles that had significant legal implications. A memorandum
drafted by the UN Office of Legal Affairs confirms this established practice
by stating that the declaration is “a formal and solemn instrument, suitable
for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being
enunciated.”34
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948 is a good
example.35 Although it is not a treaty, the Declaration turned out to be one of
the most influential instruments throughout history in mainstreaming the
principles of human rights to the world. These principles, which at its
adoption might have been viewed as controversial in many parts of the
world, eventually led to significant legal developments, including adoption
of numerous international conventions36 and domestic acts37 that contained
the letter and spirit of the Declaration. It now comprises the foundation of

32

Daniel Thürer, Soft Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW, paras. 1–2 (Mar. 2009).
33
Dinah Shelton, Soft Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (David
Armstrong ed., Routledge 2009).
34
Id. at 70.
35
See generally G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
36
The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies, U.N.
OFF. OF HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2016).
37
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SIX DECADES AFTER THE UDHR AND BEYOND 9
(Mashood A. Baderin & Manisuli Ssenyonjo eds., Ashgate 2010); Stephen Gardbaum, Human
Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 749, 750–51 (2008).
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international human rights regime.38 Section 702 of the Third Restatement of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States recognizes as part of
international law, not only political norms, but also the seven categories of
human rights abuses that the Declaration prohibits.39 The UN International
Law Commission (ILC) even acknowledges that the declared principles
include a few instances of customary international law.40
The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples may be another example demonstrating the importance of the
principles in a declaration in international law. The declaration started its
life in a shrewd attempt to avoid the procedural blockade at the UN that
could be caused by the colonial powers while there were clear needs for a set
of principles to follow among the international community navigating in the
midst of worldwide decolonization.41 Neither its form nor contents might
have been thought to expressly assert its firm legal status in international
law. In fact, these principles properly reflected the strong trends in
international legal development and the role of the Declaration was crucial
on the ground in bringing about the termination of the old system called
“Colonial Empires.”42 To this day, the Declaration represents the legal
framework in ensuring “peaceful co-existence among states,” claiming its
principles to be jus cogens in international law.43
C. Stagnation of Conventional International Law
There are not only theoretical reasons but also phenomenological ones to
recognize both hard and soft laws as valid legal instruments in international
law.44 Soft law can be identified in all fields of law, but they are particularly

38

Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), The International Bill of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS OFF.
HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. (June 1996) http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2016).
39
Daniel T. Murphy, Commentaries: The Restatement (Third)’s Human Rights
Provisions—Nothing New, But Very Welcome, 24 INT’L L. 917, 917–18 (1990).
40
Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National
and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 341 (1995–1996).
41
Edward McWhinney, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and People, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. OF INT’L L. (2008). In voting in the General
Assembly, the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
(U.K.), and France abstained with others, and there was no objection. See also United Nations
GAOR, 15th Sess., 947 plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/PV.947 (Dec. 14, 1960).
42
McWhinney, supra note 41.
43
Arnold Pronto, Understanding the Hard/Soft Distinction in International Law, 48 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 941, 953–54 (2015).
44
Id. at 950.

OF
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important and prevalent in the context of international relations.45 One
cannot state categorically that hard law binds and creates legal obligations on
states while soft law does not.46 Scholars and practitioners believe that the
binary approach cannot grasp the complexity of cases or the dynamism of
diverse legal phenomena.47 In today’s world, the separation between hard
and soft laws is not always strict or simple and it is increasingly difficult to
identify their distinctive characters.48
It has been conventional wisdom to say that whether a normative
instrument carries legally binding obligations in the international sphere
depends on the intention of the authors. However, the intention is often
mixed and its expression varies from explicit to implicit, from direct to
circumstantial. Sometimes the intention to make the instrument legal is
drawn rather clearly in internal provisions or final clauses of the instrument
itself.49 However, this is often not the case. In many instances, legal
implications are intense where states promised political commitment only.
Despite the soft form in which norms sit, or even regardless of the intention
of the authors who drafted them, the norms do frequently have “legal
consequences that go beyond what would be expected from mere statements
of aspirations.”50
Some scholars have showed uneasiness with the rise of debates on
softness in international law:
Although less visible, many scholars have chosen to advocate
an extension of the limits of classical international law by
legalizing objects which intrinsically lie outside the limits of
international law. This is precisely what the unconditional
proponents of the concept of soft law are—consciously or
unconsciously—aiming at. . . . [N]owadays, it is the
scholarship that makes the law and no longer the law that
makes the legal scholarship.51

45

Thürer, supra note 32, para. 3.
Mensah, supra note 31, at 50.
47
Jean D’Aspremont & Tanja Aalberts, Symposium on Soft Law: Which Future for the
Scholarly Concept of Soft International Law? Editors Future for the Scholar, 25 LEIDEN J.
INT.L L. 309, 309 (June 2012).
48
Id.; see also Shelton, supra note 33, at 71–75.
49
Mensah, supra note 31, at 50.
50
Id.
51
Jean D’Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal
Materials, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1090–91 (2008).
46
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This critique, however, is strikingly weak in theory and practice. In
recent years, eminent scholars have discussed the topic and published articles
and books in major publications.52 During expert debates, persistent
objectors have grounded their repeated claim on an important but overly
simplistic point that soft law is not law only because it is not intended as law,
and they usually do not present sufficient evidence to rebut the normative
value of soft law being law.
Of course, there are more subtle arguments, though they are rare. A few
scholars think that the alleged effect of soft law comes from legal facts,
which should be stricto sensu distinguishable from legal acts that can create
rights and obligations.53 However, it is incorrect that the influence that soft
law exercises is always a by-product, not the direct consequence of the will
of the states. For instance, it might be nonsensical to insist that the
participation of the head of state in an environmental conference that adopts
the outcome declaration constitutes merely a legal fact, which comprises the
entourage of the conference. It is rather evident and reasonable that the
government intended a legal act by sending its highest authority to create and
assume negotiated outcomes. Moreover, the strength of a legal act itself
depends largely on relevant legal facts.
The application of international law is now frequently called for at the
center of many challenging global issues requiring the participation of a
multitude of actors in their resolution.54 With this backdrop, states
increasingly see certain pragmatic advantages in using and developing soft
law.55 At the UN, the contemporary frontier of international law-making, a
soft law instrument gets increasing attention in cases where its Member
States are reluctant to prompt stiff legalization of a field of international
52
Picking examples only in the American Society of International Law (ASIL), a group of
distinguished scholars published their workshop about soft law as early as in 1997. See
generally STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL POLICY: INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH
NONBINDING ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss ed., ASIL 1997). Scholars also discussed the
topic in its annual meetings as recently as in 2015. For instance, in the 109th Annual Meeting,
Joseph Weiler (moderator), Jutta Brunnée, Benedict Kingsbury, Georg Nolte, and Joel
Trachtman discussed various issues posed by the development of international norms through
more flexible mechanisms. At the same meeting, Kal Raustiala (moderator), Ayelet Berman,
Dinah Shelton, Edward Swaine, and Ingo Venzke discussed the on-going stagnation of
traditional processes for making international law. See Joseph Weiler et al., Legitimacy,
Adaptability, and Consent in Modern International Law, Presentations at the 109th ASIL
Annual Meeting (Apr. 9, 2015); Kal Raustiala et al., The Stagnation in International Law,
Presentations at the 109th ASIL Annual Meeting (Apr. 9, 2015).
53
D’Aspremont supra note 51, at 1077–79.
54
Jutta Brunnée, COPing with Consent: Law-Making under Multilateral Environmental
Agreements, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2002).
55
See generally SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 3, sec. F, 96–
108 (2d ed., Thomson West 2012).
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concern, with recognition, however, that regulating it is critical. The
Member States often collectively reach an ironic conclusion in this context
that a “nonbinding approach would, in the aggregate, have a greater impact
than a formally binding text.”56
The legislative process, if we can describe it as such, to make a soft law is
cost saving.57 This does not mean that every process is compact and
manageable, but the amount of time and energy invested in concluding soft
law has been perceived to be relatively small compared to hard law that
governs an area with commensurate sensitivity and complexity.58 However,
the benefits of soft law cannot be fully explained by cost-effectiveness. As
soft law develops and its importance grows, the analysis becomes much
more complex.
Most of the outcomes of landmark international
environmental conferences organized under the auspices of the UN take
more than two years to produce at the high cost of intensive negotiations and
associated governmental processes. They may entail additional expenses if
preliminary stages, before the preparatory committee officially starts its
work, are duly taken into account. Even certain attempts fail due to lack of
consensus or deficiency of available resources notwithstanding all these
efforts.
With growing costs and risks involved, however, soft law is still
inevitable. This is particularly true in handling an emerging global
phenomenon that may significantly affect the security and welfare of a large
number of countries. For example, it is hard to make an international treaty
regulating novel environmental issues because often the scope or cause of the
problems that the issues raise has not been fully known or revealed, requiring
further scientific research. In other words, they cannot be solved simply with
additional political endeavors or instant financial investments.
Notwithstanding this prematurity, states can no longer remain idle since the
impact of the environmental problems is great and severe, whether current,
imminent or potential: “[T]he increasing sense of urgency in combating
global environmental problems has prompted calls for new approaches to
international environmental law-making . . . .”59
In such a case, national authorities and the broader international
community have preferred governing the field with soft law rather than hard
law. Making a stricter legal instrument at this stage will neither resolve the
issue, nor be realistically possible.

56
57
58
59

Pronto, supra note 43, at 942.
MURPHY, supra note 55, at 96.
Shelton, supra note 33, at 75–77.
Brunnée, supra note 54, at 2.
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Recent studies show that multilateral treaty-making on a global scale has
revealed its limitations.60 Quite a few of the multilateral environmental
agreements, which should be binding formally on paper, may not by
themselves properly influence the conduct of states. Distinguished scholars
at a recent annual meeting of the American Society of International Law
discussed the phenomenon of stagnation in producing the traditional sources
of international law including treaties.61 These sources, they observed,
started to give way to alternative mechanisms such as various forms of soft
law, and the latter filled the vacuum that had resulted from the stagnation of
the former.62 Indeed, the amount of multilateral treaties deposited with the
UN Secretary-General has not changed much for years.63 A number of
specific cases at the UN forums qualitatively support this statistical trend as
well. For example, States Parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), concluded more than thirty years ago, have since addressed
the need for a legal instrument to meet the challenges arising from the
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas
of national jurisdiction, whose regulation in the aforementioned convention
was considered sparse or unclear. Until recently, the States Parties could
reach a rough agreement on how to proceed to negotiations without knowing
the substantive direction of the negotiations or the foreseeable timeline by
which they will have a set of relevant rules.64
An increasing number of UN Member States are recognizing the
limitation of traditional international law, particularly in facing prevalent
environmental problems and addressing the need for an alternative approach,
as well illustrated by a delegate below:
60

See generally Weiler et al., supra note 52; Raustiala et al., supra note 52; Jutta Brunnée
International Legislation, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Oct. 2010); Jutta Brunnée Consent, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oct. 2010).
61
Weiler et al., supra note 52; Raustiala et al., supra note 52.
62
Weiler et al., supra note 52; Raustiala et al., supra note 52.
63
Per the screenshots of the relevant web pages taken by the Wayback Machine, the total
number of multilateral treaties deposited with the UN Secretary-General has only slightly
increased from 2009 until 2015. The Secretariat itself described on its web pages that the
number was 500 for years. The Treaty Section in the UN Office of Legal Affairs tried to rebut
the evidence of stagnation in treaty-making in its own annual Seminar on Treaty Law and
Practice held on June 2, 2015. See Anonymous*, The Work of the Treaty Section of the U.N.
Office of Legal Affairs, Presentation at the Annual Seminar on Treaty Law and Practice (June
2, 2015). *The name of the presenter has been omitted deliberately.
64
Relevant negotiations have been accelerated and intensified only since Rio+20 decided to
urgently address the issue. See G.A. Res. 66/288, The Future We Want, ¶ 162 (July 27, 2012).
In this regard, a Preparatory Committee established by General Assembly Resolution 69/292
is expected to produce meaningful outcomes in developing an international legally binding
instrument under UNCLOS.
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[T]he traditional response of international law, developing
international legal standards in small incremental steps, each of
which must be subsequently ratified by all countries, is no
longer appropriate to deal with the highly complex
environmental problems of the future. The time has come for
something more innovative, for a conceptual leap
forward. . . .65
The norms discussed here might not be legally binding, but they are taken
seriously by both state and non-state actors, who are the subjects of
international law today.66 They have “the effect of narrowing the options
that would otherwise be legally-available,” thereby delegitimizing some part
of existing rules and practices and preparing a new bundle of international
law in the relevant field.67 It may not only be because the norms are at least
politically binding, but also because the legal principle of good faith or
estoppel applies to those who agreed upon them.68
Many soft law norms do not stop formally being a political instrument per
se, but will soon effectively turn themselves into legally binding rules.69 For
this reason, soft laws are increasingly recognized, or even actually intended,
by state authors as “evidence of law” that should be applied to govern state
behavior in relevant fields. Thus, from the initial drafting stage states would
try to crystallize only later applicable law into these norms.70 For example,
the principle that the seabed and its resources are the common heritage of
mankind was included in a resolution of the UN General Assembly as the
first step in the process of developing a relevant treaty regime, and states
would recognize the principle as applicable law before the UNCLOS
incorporating it came into being.71 A state decision to adopt soft law is
therefore another expression of its desire to make it officially hard law.
D. Analogous Legal Justification for Outcome Principles and International
Law
If a norm is to be called “law,” it must meet four basic requirements: the
existence of a norm, the subject to which it is directed, the legislative process
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 15th plen. mtg. at 76, U.N. Doc. A/44/PV.15 (Oct. 6, 1989).
MURPHY, supra note 55, at 96.
Id.
Id.
Pronto, supra note 43, at 954.
Mensah, supra note 31, at 50.
Id. at 50–51.
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to make the norm law, and the enforcement mechanism.72 The first two are
met in case of both international law and outcome principles generated by a
major UN environmental conference. Thus, the existence of the legislative
process and the compliance mechanism is the key to grant a firm legal status
to the two distinct types of norms.
Above all, in testing the legal status of soft law principles, scholars have
highlighted the problem of the lack of a legislative process. The outcome
principles of the major UN environmental conferences have been produced
through multilateral diplomatic processes. They are, however, fairly wellfounded: preliminary steps to raise awareness among the Member States and
the broader international community, an initial phase to trigger the General
Assembly process towards convening a conference, stages for the works of a
preparatory committee to create a zerodraft, including working group and
expert meetings if necessary, intergovernmental negotiations based on the
zerodraft to conclude the first draft before holding the conference, and final
negotiations, revisions, and adoption of the text in the actual conference
proceedings. Obviously, this whole course is full of deviations and
anomalies compared to a congressional legislative process. From domestic
viewpoints, there is no stable procedure, coherent coordination or democratic
legitimacy.
However, it is interesting that the situation is not different in the case of
treaty-making.73 Although variations may exist, multilateral treaty-making
more or less follows the same processes that soft law principles have to go
through. They share material bases from platforms of a legislative process to
participants. For instance, the format of a diplomatic conference under the
auspices of the UN has been used not only for major environmental
conferences that produced soft law principles governing the field but also for
international law-making forums. Both are allowed to have their own rules
of procedure, but the default is the Rules of Procedure of the UN General
Assembly. Coordinators of such conferences are not necessarily top experts
on the topic and procedure of the conferences. In addition, delegates have
not been elected by their people even though they might be the agent of a
democratically elected head of state or include that head of state self. For
this reason, if the diplomatic process to make a treaty is an effective

72
SALEM H. NASSER, SOURCES AND NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (Mobility & Norm
Change Vol. 7, Galda & Wilch Verlag 2008).
73
International law-making processes, including ones for multilateral treaties, are generally
described as “eclectic, unsystematic, overlapping, and often poorly coordinated.” See ALAN
BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98–103 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2007).
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legislative process, so is the process to make outcome principles. If the latter
cannot be recognized as such, the former should not either.
From the early stages of modern legal philosophy, the enforcement
mechanism was believed essential in guaranteeing compliance and realizing
the law’s binding nature.74 The mechanics of international society are,
however, different from those of national societies. So far, international
society does not have a judicial organ with comprehensive compulsory
jurisdiction, a centralized enforcement system including a standing police
force or army, or an executive body that governs all these institutions as in
the domestic sphere.75 Without any of these institutional guarantees, it is
perhaps difficult to make the case that international law is binding. Indeed,
in most cases international law does not enforce the obligations that it
intends to impose.76 If international law is de facto non-enforceable, how
can it be called law?77 Another relevant argument is that the enforcement
mechanism of international law is inapplicable against powerful countries or
disproportionately serves their interest.78 On the other hand, there can be
historical and contextual discourses to explain weaknesses in the
enforcement of international law. International law is evolving relative to
the growth of the international community and the latter may not yet have
reached the level of sophistication that an advanced domestic system
enjoys.79 Scholars also consider that international law has idiosyncrasies

74
John Austin argued as early as the 1830s that law could be distinguished from other
normative domains because of a threat to sanctions backed by the political sovereign. Hans
Kelsen also had the view that a mechanism that enabled the law to “impose its demands” was
“the most important of law’s function.” See Andrei Marmor & Alexander Sarch, The Nature
of Law, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (last updated Aug. 7, 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/lawphil-nature.
75
Malcolm Shaw, International Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britanni
ca.com/topic/international-law (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
76
Andrew T. Guzman, Rethinking International Law as Law, 103 ASIL PROC. 155, 155
(2009).
77
Some scholars cast serious doubts on whether international law deserves to be called a
kind of law. See generally Antonia Chayes, International Agreements: Why They Count as
Law, 103 ASIL PROC. 158, 158–161 (2009); John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in
International Affairs?, 10 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1–48 (2000); Eric A. Posner,
Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1901,
1901–19 (2003).
78
Posner, supra note 77, at 1909–16.
79
Since Kant’s philosophical sketch titled “Perpetual Peace,” there have been academic
works focused upon the development of global governance, including a common
governmental authority for all humanity. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (1795).
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because its societal environment differs considerably from its domestic
equivalent.80
All the above theses apply perfectly to explain soft law. Indeed, soft law
has been rejected as international law for the same deficiencies. Soft law is
known to be most vulnerable to the criticism that it lacks a binding nature as
well as an enforcement mechanism, thus being unable to attract compliance.
Therefore, traditional scholarship believed that soft law norms had validity as
social or political barometers, which provided guidelines and standards to the
extent they were socially or politically useful and influential, but could not
provide legal rights and obligations nor guarantee punishment or
compensation against an act of non-compliance or omission of an act
required for compliance. Furthermore, during the course of all historic UN
environmental conferences, delegations from developing countries
complained that terms in the outcome might cause them difficulties while
mostly benefitting the developed countries. In addition, evolutionism and
contextualism, which can be used to refute the criticisms that international
law is not law, have the same merits in defense of soft law.
Further down the road, what will be the true meaning of the bindingness
of law? Is compliance with law possible without enforcement, or is law
somehow enforceable without an enforcement mechanism? In the Austinian
conception of law, the word “binding” refers firstly to the enforceability of a
norm by a sovereign power that dominates the use of force.81 That is to say,
law must be complied with, and if this is not the case, physical or other
coercive force will intervene to make it so, including imposing penalties or
levying costs for non-compliance. However, such a conception of law is not
always true or real, in both domestic and international realms, and
particularly in the latter. Thus, the distinction between law and non-law
made by the enforceability of each norm may not be correct in international
law.
It is generally understood that conduct becomes non-optional when it is
coerced by force. However, similar obligatory behavior can also be attained
through an intense social response that falls short of physical sanctions
authorized by a government, so long as they are of a scope and magnitude

80
For example, Emmerich de Vattel defined principles as a set of legally enforceable
norms, articulated within diplomatic practice, thus rendering their application fit for
international relations. See Amanda Perreau-Saussine, Lauterpacht and Vattel on the Sources
of International Law: The Place of Private Law Analogies and General Principles, in
VATTELPACHT AND VATTEL ON THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 167, 170–73 (Vincent
Chetail & Peter Haggenmacher eds., Martinus Nijhoff 2011).
81
Mehrdad Payandeh, The Concept of International Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A.
Hart, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 967, 969 (2010).
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that could produce a result of habitual compliance.82 Once turning away
from a rigid positivist thesis, a law can be identified whenever conduct was
made non-optional or obligatory regardless of the sources of influence that
made actors comply with the law.83 At the international level, public opinion
in the international community has performed the same function with
incremental power and dynamism. The efficacy of naming and shaming by
the international community is now critical in changing state behavior as
international relations become dense and interwoven due to many global
agendas that affect the daily life of peoples in multiple countries. Therefore,
it is right to conclude that in order to understand international law today we
need to accept a broader definition of the bindingness in law.
This is also the key to properly address the state of soft law in
international law. Whereas many scholars permit putting aside the
traditional meaning of bindingness in evaluating the legal status of
international law, they still would like to apply it strictly to soft law for fear
that it might seriously compromise international law scholarship. They do
not want to make international law more vulnerable by officially
accommodating any soft law as a valid source of international law.
Redemption from softness is, however, a critical challenge for both
international law and soft law, and international law scholarship, despite all
defenses (and attacks), cannot provide irrefutable logic and rationale to
detach itself from soft law. Soft law is soft more or less to the extent of
international law, and it is very difficult to discover a categorical difference
between the two. This is particularly so, if a soft law instrument has
acquired its normative power from “principles.”
IV. PRINCIPLES AS A SHARED SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOFT
LAW
Interestingly, despite the fact that both international law and soft law do
not satisfy a fundamental condition to be law, states have somehow chosen a
limited number of international law sources and decided to give them
recognition as possible means to create their legal obligations.84 According
to traditional legal scholarship, these sources of international law are roughly
identical to what the ICJ Statute requested the Court to apply when an
82
H.L.A. Hart called this intense social response a “general pressure for conformity” and
thought that it may qualify as the binding attribute of law. See Sean D. Murphy, The Concept
of International Law, 103 ASIL PROC. 165, 166–67 (2009).
83
Id. at 166.
84
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 5–6 (Dinah Shelton ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
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international dispute arose and has been brought to the Court.85
Notwithstanding the invention of a class of “hard international law,” the
distinction between international law and soft law becomes much more
difficult when it comes to evaluating the legal status of principles. First of
all, the term “principles” is the name that is found in both categories as a
source of law (or norm if one would argue that soft law is not a law in the
true sense). As explained previously, an instrument of soft law with stricter
formality and influences, such as a declaration, often contains principles as
its main source that endows normative power to that instrument.86 In
international law, too, as Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ illustrates,
principles are regarded as a source of law:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply . . . the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.87
Whereas a soft law declaration often contains principles as its main
content, they are found, only occasionally and partially, in international
conventions or in the form of international custom, and it is difficult to
identify any separate type of international law instruments that typically
contains principles. Additionally, there is no international law or soft law
instrument at all that provides a clear and express definition.88 However, the
ICJ Statute listing them as an independent source provides itself considerable
clues to this long-standing but little known source that allegedly belongs to
law and non-law simultaneously.

85
Id. Decisions of the ICJ binds the state parties and have affected the behavior of other
states seriously by setting precedents, despite the provision to the contrary in the statute of the
Court. See Statue of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
86
The paragraphs of the Declaration are given an explicit title with numbers such as
Principle 1, Principle 2, and so forth. Sometimes, there is a description at the start or end of
the text that its contents represent principles. Or, though only implicitly, the form and
substance of an instrument indicates that it indeed includes legal principles.
87
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute is different from Article 38 of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). The PCIJ Statute only prescribes that the
Court shall apply the four sources listed in its Article 38 and does not specify their legal
character expressly although they should be the sources of international law. The ICJ Statute
is clearer on this and adds a new parenthesis: by applying the four sources, the Court is to
decide a case “in accordance with international law.” In this way, the ICJ Statute vividly
states that they are the sources of international law.
88
MURPHY, supra note 55, ch. 3, sec. C, at 86–88.
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A. Linguistic Analysis
Linguistically, it seems that “principles” as a source of international law
has to satisfy specific conditions added to those “principles” as a source of
soft law. It may then be important to examine what the conditions are and
whether they draw meaningful distinctions between the two kinds of
principles. From part of the JCJ Statute cited above, these conditions are
described by the additional linguistic clusters that include “general,” “of
law,” and “recognized by civilized nations.” The first and the third are
closely linked, making one semantic unit insofar as “general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations” cannot be distinguishable from
“principles of law generally recognized by civilized nations” or “principles
of law recognized by civilized nations generally.” It means the generality of
a principle can be acquired ultimately by the recognition given by states,
rather than simply the generality of substance within a principle at hand.89
Such an understanding may also be confirmed by the usage of the same
term in other parts of the same article in the ICJ Statute. Apparently article
38(1)(a) distinguishes the international conventions into two types: “general
or particular.”90 Contextually this phrase is more obscure than clear and by
itself does not explain much.91 The differentiation between general and
particular treaties was not clear in the travaux préparatoires, either.92
Through subsequent practices, the Court has hardly approved this
bifurcation. However, if it did, it usually referred to the distinction between
multilateral and bilateral treaties respectively, which means that in the
Court’s understanding the term “general” was, if ever, associated closely
with the recognition given by the larger number of states.93 In summary, it
can be said based on a textual analysis, drafters’ intention, and subsequent
usage that the general rules of interpretation of a treaty provided in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties support the above semantics.94
The same is true for Article 38(1)(b), which states that international custom
89

Continental law and legal theories have recognized the notion of general principles of
law as one of the sources of law. In the domestic context, general principles of law count
generality acquired by law in a society. See generally Neha Jain, Judicial Lawmaking and
General Principles of Law in International Criminal Law, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J. 111 (2016).
90
ICJ Statute art. 38(1)(a).
91
Alain Pellet, Article 38, in STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A
COMMENTARY 731, 809 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
92
Id.
93
Id. at 810. Regarding a scholarly quest for distinction between general and particular
treaties, see also Grigory Tunkin, Is General International Law Customary Law Only?, 4 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 534, 536–39 (1993).
94
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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is the evidence of “a general practice accepted as law.”95 The term “general”
describes the geographical scope of the practice, which strongly implies the
great number of countries involved in the practice in question.96 In a recent
report on the identification of customary international law, the ILC defined
“particular” customary international law, which was a concept relative to
“general” customary international law, as the rule of international custom
applicable only among a limited number of states.97 Their conclusion
reaffirms that the meaning of the statutory term “general” can be reduced to
describing the state of involvement or recognition by the number of countries
to the extent of acquiring generality on a global scale.
Dealing with the “general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations,” the ICJ agreed to rename this source of international law as a
“generally recognized principle of law” in an advisory opinion on the Effect
of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal.98 The court goes further to omit the word “general” in another
advisory opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, showing the Court’s interpretation
that this modifier is not crucial to understand the character of “principles” as
the third binding source of international law under the Statute:
The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention
of the United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as “a
crime under international law” involving a denial of the right of
existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the
conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity,
and which is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of
the United Nations (Resolution 96 (I) of the General Assembly,
11 December 1946). The first consequence arising from this
conception is that the principles underlying the Convention are
principles which are recognized by civilized nations as

95

ICJ Statute art. 38(1)(b).
Pellet, supra note 91, at 829.
97
Int’l Law Comm’n, Identification of Customary International Law: Text of the Draft
Conclusions Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.869,
Draft Conclusion 16[15], at 4 (2015) [hereinafter ILC Identification of Customary
International Law]; see also Olufemi Elias, The Relationship between General and Particular
Customary International Law, 8 RADIC 67–88 (1996).
98
Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 47, at 53 (July 13, 1954).
96
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binding on States, even without any conventional obligation
(emphasis added).99
There have been scholarly attempts to identify differences between
general and non-general principles. It was thought only the former
constituted an international legal source under Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ
Statute although both were effective in systematization, interpretation, or
progressive development of international law.100 However, even these
scholars had to admit that often the two kinds could not be separated, thus
principles as a mere enabler for legal systemization, interpretation, or
advancement cannot be clearly distinguishable from those constituting an
international legal source.101 Their conclusion is inevitable because
principles are essentially general considering their jurisprudential nature, as
previously explained, albeit that they can occasionally be applied to specific
cases.102 Of course, it might be conceivable that there are “more general”
principles than others. In other words, some of the principles, such as the
principle of proportionality, cover an extremely wide territory of application,
whereas others, such as nullum crimen sine lege, are applicable only in a
single field of law.103 Alternatively, there may exist principles with a higher
level of generalization that subsume other principles.104 However, all these
principles are general in their very nature—the nature which causes the
former to guide the latter in application and interpretation. Generality was

99
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, at 12 (May 28). In Corfu Channel, the ICJ used
the term “general and well-recognized principles” in its judgment.” See Corfu Channel (U.K.
v. Albania), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 22 (Apr. 9) [hereinafter Corfu Channel Case].
100
Rüdiger Wolfrum, General International Law (Principles, Rules, and Standards), in MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 20 (Dec. 2010).
101
Id.
102
Georg Schwarzenberger noted in his lecture at the Hague Academy of International Law
that every principle is an abstraction and generalization from individual cases or legal rules of
an apparently more limited scope. See Georg Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles
of International Law, in 87 RECUEIL DES COURS 191, 201 (1955). In the Gulf of Maine case,
the ICJ said that principles included rules of international law, thus applicable to cases by the
Court, and still the use of the term “principles” may be justified “because of their more
general and more fundamental character.” See Gulf of Maine (Canada v. U.S.), Judgment,
1984 I.C.J. Rep. 246, para. 79, at 288–90 (Oct. 12). Dworkin also said that principles are
norms more or less general in any way. See Muñiz, supra note 21, at 269.
103
NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO
LEGAL RULES 238 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
104
Schwarzenberger called them the fundamental principles of international law. Note,
however, that he correctly understood that the principles listed in Article 38(1)(c) include not
only the fundamental principles but also principles that do not reach the same level of
abstraction. See also Schwarzenberger, supra note 102, at 200–03.
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not a term selected by the drafters of the ICJ Statute to make a categorical
distinction between different kinds of principles in this way. Instead, they
defined the term according to the level and scope of recognition given by
states to a certain principle.105 The drafters of the original text understood
that general principles were those principles recognized by all or majority
nations, and the part “recognized by civilized nations” was an indication of
where the recognition of that generality originated.
It might still be necessary to unpack the enigmatic phrase, “recognized by
civilized nations.” The focus on the term “civilized” inserted earlier in the
PCIJ Statute has shifted partly because the UN membership became open to
all peace-loving states under the Charter in 1945, which has become a
barometer, if any, for a country’s level of civilization. However, this phrase
remains valid except for that archaic modifier. There were different opinions
in describing the way nations recognized the principles. In particular, some
positivists have believed that general principles should consist solely of
domestic legal principles.106 Alain Pellet concluded in his commentary to
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute that general principles of law must be
discovered in domestic rules.107 This extreme position also appeared among
the Advisory Committee of Jurists, who drafted the PCIJ Statute, the
predecessor of the ICJ. Lord Phillimore, Member of Privy Council of His
Majesty the King of England, understood that the recognition referred to foro
domestico.108 He thought that the only way to avoid resorting to a legal norm
in amorphous shape was to rely on the authority of a principle as it had
developed from municipal law with established traditions thereby reducing
the possibility of arbitrary application and interpretation.
However, other drafters did not seem to have agreed that principles
should only come from national law. Elihu Root, former Secretary of State
of the United States, who otherwise agreed with Phillimore on almost all
other aspects, subtly differed when he said that law might vary from country

105

Drafters did not contend that a state could approve a norm as a general principle while
opting out of others as non-general principles. Generality of a principle has not been
discussed in this way.
106
Abdul G. Koroma, The Application of International Law by the International Court of
Justice, in 4 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE XIAMEN ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 127
(2011).
107
Pellet, supra note 91, at 769–70. Note that Pellet describes himself as being “neither a
positivist, nor a moralist.” See Jost Delbrück et al., Comments on Chapter 13 and 14, in
UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 416, 421
(Michael Byes & Georg Nolte eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
108
P.C.I.J. ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS, PROCÈS-VERBAUX OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE COMMITTEE, JUNE 16TH–JULY 24TH 1920, WITH ANNEXES 335 (Van Langenhuysen
Brothers 1920) [hereinafter P.C.I.J. ADVISORY COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS].
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to country and thus a separate accord among states would be necessary to
mark a rule to be applicable as a source of international law.109 Arturo RicciBusatti, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, also agreed
to limit international legal sources to positive law but did not pay much
attention to domestic law.110 Furthermore, Baron Descamps, Senator and
Belgian Minister of State and then President of the committee, emphasized
the importance of the demands of public conscience at the international level
as a form of recognition by civilized nations.111 Switzerland, one of the core
stakeholders in establishing the PCIJ, also clarified that principles should
come not from municipal law but from the law of nations, which was another
name for international law at the time.112
It might be helpful to check against the usage of the term in other parts of
the same statute. Article 38(1)(a) lists as another source of international law
“international conventions . . . that establish rules expressly recognized by
the contesting states.”113 The focus here textually and in practice is on an
agreement of states. Whether what is agreed internationally already is
contained in the domestic rules of the respective states does not matter. In
most cases, a government usually agrees on a set of rules when they are not
in contravention with relevant domestic rules. However, this does not
always mean that the former have existed as domestic law. The recognition
by states refers to their agreement only and is logically distinguishable from
domestic legal situations. The existence of municipal rules is not a necessary
or sufficient condition for the international convention to establish rules.
Conversely, it is rather clear that there have always existed fields that need to
be regulated and governed, to which most domestic laws do not yet apply.
Prime examples would be some of the newly emerging environmental areas.
Even though there are a handful of innovative countries whose governments
pioneered the regulation of these areas, simple transposition of their domestic
law to international law may not be adopted by other members of the
international community.114

109

Id. at 287, 310.
Id. at 314–15. Ricci-Busatti rather preferred to have “a reference to international
jurisprudence.”
111
Id. at 310.
112
Id. at 91.
113
Id.
114
On the other hand, Lauterpacht is the champion of the idea that private law rules can
become sources of international law through analogy. He believed the common law principles
are indeed a part of international law. See Perreau-Saussine, supra note 80.
110
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The plain meaning of “recognized by civilized nations” does not
necessarily coincide with “recognized in civilized nations.”115 Rather,
general principles recognized by nations should refer to those principles so
widely recognized “by” civilized nations that the type of recognition can be
characterized as general recognition. Those principles known to be derived
from sources other than domestic law must pass the same test that civilized
nations perform collectively to serve as a source of international law.116 As a
set of legally enforceable norms, principles must be articulated and screened
through diplomatic exercises on a global scale to render their application fit
for international relations. Surely, this source of international law also
includes laws directly derived from the specific nature of international
relations and the international community that is involved in those relations,
which are not necessarily identical to municipal laws.117 The ICJ also
approves this approach.118 In the same vein, even though a principle is
premature, not established in the domestic context and considered at best an
example of progressive legal development from the standpoint of traditional
scholars in a certain country, it still can be recognized as international law.
For instance, in the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ found that the general
principle of innocent passage should stand as a source of international law
115
Phillimore, the only drafter who had insisted that principles should come from domestic
law, stated that “the general principles referred to in point 3 were these which were accepted
by all nations in foro domestico.” Here, he actually added “in foro domestico” to “by all
nations” even though the latter phrase alone is sufficient to represent the meaning of “by
civilized nations.” See P.C.I.J. ADVISORY COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 108, at 335.
116
Abdul G. Koroma suggests four categories of general principles (principles derived from
domestic law, principles of international law, basic rules and maxims, and principles
governing judicial procedure and evidence) and Oscar Schachter proposed six categories
(principles of municipal law that are recognized by civilized nations, principles that are
derived from the unique character of the international community, principles that are intrinsic
to the idea of law and basic to all legal systems, universalist principles that are valid through
all kinds of human societies and that echo the idea of natural law, and principles of justice that
are premised on the rational and social nature of human beings). See Koroma, supra note 106,
at 118–22; OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 50–55 (1991);
Neha Jain, Judicial Lawmaking and General Principles of Law in International Criminal Law,
57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 111, 117 (2016). These categorical approaches could not sacrifice the
requirement of recognition; that is to say, regardless of its origin and kind, a general principle
should be “recognized by civilized nations.”
117
Koroma called “principles of international law” and Schachter explained them by using a
detailed description “principles that are derived from the unique character of the international
community.” Generally, scholars today do not confine the origin of general principles in foro
domestico. See Koroma supra note 106, at 119; SCHACHTER, supra note 116, at 50.
118
Providing several ICJ cases, Gaja notes as follows: “When the ICJ referred to principles
of international law or to general principles, it often considered principles that do not find a
parallel in municipal laws.” See Giorgio Gaja, General Principles of Law, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 17 (May 2013).
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that the court could apply even when there was no such domestic rule, and
was unable to find an obligation specifically applicable to Albania’s
conduct.119
The same is true with many of the principles enshrined in the outcome
documents of the major UN environmental conferences. For example, the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities of states might not
have existed domestically in some countries when it first appeared in the
Stockholm Declaration.120 Of course, it could be said that by that time the
normativity of this principle as a source of international law lived in the
conscience of people of the world that day. Over a hundred heads of state
and government as well as numerous representatives from civil society
organizations participated in Stockholm in 1972 and confirmed the principle.
In particular, that fact that a great deal of states adopted the principle satisfies
the core requirement that is expressed in the “general
principles . . . recognized by civilized nations.”121
The third addition “of law” might be redundant theoretically and
practically. It is self-evident that principles on how to govern a field of
international concern are legal principles rather than the principles of
physics, economics, or politics. For instance, a principle in physics explains
how the natural world works in general.122 Physical principles therefore are
not man-made whereas legal principles are.123 The difference here comes
from the dissemblance in the two worlds that respective disciplines aim to
explain. However, the conceptual difference in various types of principles
does not have a single dimension. The possible confusion between legal
principles and moral or political principles might not be resolved in the
aforementioned fashion. Perhaps, for the purpose of this Article, the former
119

Corfu Channel Case, supra note 99, at 22.
The Stockholm Declaration approved, for the first time, the existence of collective
responsibilities among states for environmental problems though with varying degrees
according to the economic situation of respective states, when it states that “the applicability
of standards which are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate
and of unwarranted social cost for the developing countries.” See Stockholm Declaration,
supra note 10, Principle 23.
121
Id. at 116.
122
John W. Carroll, Laws of Nature, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/laws-of-nature (last updated Aug. 22, 2016).
123
Medieval jurists thought analogously, however, that there were natural laws enacted by
God, thus unable to be defeated just as the law of nature in physics will come true without
exception. According to the tradition, Vattel understood that the law of nations referred to
those “principles of the law of nature” that were applicable to the “conduct and affairs of
nations and sovereigns.” See also EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS,
WITH THREE EARLY ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF NATURAL LAW AND ON LUXURY
(Liberty Fund, Inc. 2008) (1797).
120
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can translate into the principles attached with legal obligations while the
latter are those only having moral or political influence. The distinction “of
law” does not emanate from the subject area that the principles are to cover,
but has more to do with their normative status, to which the question of the
modifier “legal” or “moral” is merely inconsequential.
If the status of a principle has sufficient legal implications, it leans
towards the principle of law. Thus, the proper inquiry is about how much
normative power principles have, not about whether they are a priori legal or
As previously discussed,
moral, simply begging the question.124
jurisprudentially a principle lies between the value, which is moral or
political in nature, and the rule, which is legal in nature. Thus, it is
inappropriate to say that the status of a principle is strictly moral/political or
legal. For instance, “equality” serves both as a legal and political principle.
Judges of an international court will use equality as a legal principle if they
need to apply it as a source of law in adjudicating a case. There is no rule
that requires an international court to categorically exclude this principle
from the applicable sources of law. Nor is there an inherent obstacle to call
the principle legal, as long as it is intended to govern a field of international
concern and is generally recognized as such by states. Exactly the same
applies with soft law principles. If it is difficult to discern a legal principle
from a soft law principle, it is only inasmuch difficult as to identify which
principle falls on a legal source for international law and which one does not.
B. Drafter’s Formula
The drafters of the PCIJ Statute spared considerable time and energy in
arguing for and against the validity of principles as law. In fact, the focus of
their discussions about the concept of principles was much more radical than
today’s perspectives. They did not make a distinction between soft and hard
law principles at all. Rather, drafters directly applied the arguments related
to soft law that critics use today to evaluate the legal status of what then
became a binding source of international law. Initially a few of them raised
serious doubts whether principles could ever be considered law. This is
exactly the same sort of suspicion attached to soft law principles all the time.
Thus, drafters questioned a thesis that the Court could deliver judgment
based on general principles believing only positive law as a valid source of
international law.125
124
See also Anthony H. Lesser, H.L.A. Hart on International Law, 11 KRITIKOS, Apr.–Sept.
2014, http://intertheory.org/HartandInternationalLaw-AHLesser.htm.
125
See P.C.I.J. ADVISORY COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 108, at 229–30, 286–287
(paying particular attention to the comments made by Root).
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Among them, Phillimore relied upon domestic law, as discussed earlier,
with the reasoning that any political influence or judicial arbitrariness must
be blocked in the Court’s adjudication under international law and the best
way to guarantee this blockage was to use positive domestic law. Instead,
Ricci-Busatti, in fear that general principles might be interpreted at variance
in different countries, leaned towards applying universally recognized
positive rules of international law.126 Root argued that the Convention
relative to the Creation of an International Prize Court, adopted to establish
an arbitral court at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, could not
enter into force because it included principles as an applicable source of law
and states refused to run the risk of having another unpredictable court.127
The scholars insisted that in cases where there are only principles
available as a legal source for its judgment, the court should “declare itself
incompetent” or “limit itself to making a recommendation instead of
pronouncing sentence.”128 According to them, when there was no applicable
rule, the matter in question was political in nature and parties should appeal
to the Council of the League of Nations, which had competency to resolve
the cases that could not be dealt with in a court according to law. They
thought that otherwise countries would not be willing to comply with the
court’s decision and the drafters’ scheme for compulsory jurisdiction might
not work in practice.129 Their argument strongly implies a reflection at the
time that international courts had failed to promote the peaceful settlement of
international disputes. As a potential consequence, judicially uncontrolled
exercises of political powers contributed to fostering the context that enabled
the outbreak of World War I.
However, the rest of the members of the Advisory Committee disagreed
with this view. Francis Hagerup, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Norway at Stockholm replied that
the Court could not effectively contribute to the development of international
law under a construction that excluded principles as a basis of the PCIJ
Mineichiro Adatci, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
decision.130
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Brussels indicated a
problem in the presupposition of the theory that the Court could not deliver
judgment where there were no conventional international laws.131 Bernard
126

Id. at 314–15.
See Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War, Feb. 26, 1909, pmbl. para. 3,
preliminary provision, https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/255?OpenDocument.
128
P.C.I.J. ADVISORY COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 108, at 309–10.
129
Id. at 286.
130
Id. at 308.
131
Id.
127
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Loder, Justice of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, who later became
the first President of the PCIJ, also affirmed that it was constant and clear in
international jurisdictions that judicial silence on the matter presented to it
amounted to a denial of justice and thus the judge should decide upon cases
even when there is no conventional or customary law.132 Descamps further
emphasized that principles would actually impose a duty on the judges by
preventing them from relying upon subjective opinions and using too much
discretion:
That was the law which could not be disregarded by a judge, a
law which in practice, whether it is wished to or not, a judge
never would disregard.133
He also referred back to the Hague Conference and testified that as
opposed to Root’s summary participant states opined at the time that the law
of war was not only formed by rules but also by the “demands of [the] public
conscience,” by which he meant principles.134 Descamps provided his
observation that, unlike certain rules of secondary importance, principles
were relatively stable and authoritative.135 As sessions were completed, the
members of the committee, including the three opponents, agreed that there
were cases in which the Court should apply new rules. The true nature of the
international arena goes beyond not just the coverage provided by domestic
legal systems but also the judicial territory regulated by convention or
custom.136 Global affairs often include the field of law, where there is no
exact convention and the formation of custom is also unclear or still in
progress. Thanks to the undeniable necessity of principles, the Advisory
Committee finally reached an agreement to include principles as one of the
sources of international law for the PCIJ.137
Debates in the committee do not support adversaryism about the legal
validity of soft law compared to hard law. As previously mentioned, there
was no distinction made at all between hard law principles and soft law
principles in the drafting committee’s discussion. Even though some would
like to be more subtle in their arguments, which might still enable us to
132

Id. at 312.
Id. at 311.
134
Id. at 310. Albert de Lapradelle, Professor of the Faculty of Law of the University of
Paris, also said that the failure of the London Declaration had nothing to do with the alleged
unwillingness of participant states to accept the general principles as a source of law.
Hagerup also agreed with Lapradellee’s understanding of the proceedings. Id. at 286–87, 317.
135
Id. at 310–11.
136
Id. at 323.
137
Id. at 319.
133
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distinguish general principles binding states from principles that do not have
such force or restrict the application of the third source of international law
itself. However, at least the original view by drafters of the PCIJ Statute was
that principles should be recognized as a legal source more broadly—without
a hard-soft distinction. Of course, the drafters who supported the inclusion
of principles in the list of sources of international law also had in mind the
need to clarify the meaning and boundary of principles in order to avoid
misuse and abuse.138 However, in the end they decided to add principles to
the list of sources of law applicable in the adjudication of the PCIJ while
they could not discover any proper measure to respond to possible confusion
and doubt.139 More precisely, they did not appear to make much effort to
address this concern—or perhaps need not have done so—except an
elucidation that these rules could stand insofar as they dictated the “legal
conscience of civilized nations,” that is to say, ones “approved by universal
public opinion.”140 This may be the critical resolution to address those
weaknesses conceivably intrinsic to principles as a legal source.
Further notable is that drafters used the terminology “principles” in their
discussion without any modifiers. The report of their discussion shows that
principles themselves represent their general legal character as far as they are
recognized by the majority of states.141 As a matter of fact, judiciaries have
used principles quite often.142 A growing number of scholars today also

138

The President of the Advisory Committee of Jurists mentioned that “one of the most
important tasks of the Committee is to try to make them so clear as to be proof against
dispute.” Participants in the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899 already recognized the
same need. Id. at 322.
139
Phillimore did not discard the thesis that general principles should be derived solely from
foro domestico almost until the end of the relevant discussion. However, his approach did not
represent the general ideas of the Committee. It seemed that Phillimore desired to be
consistent in raising what he thought was important while allowing others to win the game,
which is a known practice and part of the art of consensus in the context of multilateral
diplomacy. Summarizing the debates on general principles Fernandes concluded that
international affairs needed principles as a source for the Court’s adjudication just as domestic
affairs needed principles as such for the same purpose. In doing so, he did not assimilate the
former with the latter, nor did he even contemplate a link between the two. Id. at 345–46.
140
Id. at 318–19; see also Gaja, supra note 118, para. 3. Again, some possible reasons for
this passivity could be found in their understanding of international relations as the context in
which to realize the ideal of law. This view was expressed in a speech by Descamps on the
rules of law to be applied in an international court. See P.C.I.J. ADVISORY COMMITTEE
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 108, at 322–23.
141
Descamps provided his two-fold complementary evidence to test the existence of a
principle: “the concurrent teachings of jurisconsults of authority” and “the public conscience
of civilized nations.” Fernandes added that those principles should not have been rejected by
the legal traditions of one of the Sates concerned in a dispute. See id. at 324.
142
See id. at 135.
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concede such legal significance of principles.143 Most of the drafters of the
PCIJ Statute themselves believed principles were a trustworthy source of
law, rather than something arbitrarily crafted, in their pursuit of “objective
justice.”144 Moreover, that objectivity can be acquired by the recognition of
states in accordance with the statutory language. They believed that the legal
conscience of civilized nations that a judge should be allowed to take into
account would be illustrated clearly on certain occasions.145 These occasions
are, according to the drafters, when the assembly of civilized states
unanimously approved a group of relevant principles.146 Thus, from the
beginning, the only proof that some principles were a legal source could be
found in the weighty consensus of a large number of convened states.
C. Practice in International Conferences: A New Legislative Process
Principles declared in a conference carry stronger implications when they
mobilize larger and more significant participation. The scope and level of
representation at an international conference becomes a meaningful
parameter to gauge the political will of the international community behind
the conference. Ultimately, it determines the intensity of normative power
loaded onto the outcomes of the conference. Countries sending their
delegates to an international conference often have their interests at stake
when putting their own national positions and priorities in the proceedings of
the conference, including in its final outcome. Above all, when the
conference attracts many high-level participants, these leaders’ statements in
the conference and acts of adoption of the outcome directly affect their
national behavior, policy and legislation. It might not be exactly clear what
legal effect and meaning the participation of the head of state or the act of his
or her adoption of the outcome gives to the status of the outcome. However,
in a conference under the auspices of the UN to adopt an outcome assuming
to govern a field of global concern, a Member State will not send her
president or prime minister without expecting any significant legal effect and
meaning. In this context, the choice of level and size of a delegation by a
government is an official expression of their will (or reluctance) about the
conference and its outcome.
143

See the discussion outlined in supra note 52.
Descamps named principles as a source of international law for the PCIJ as a means to
achieve “objective justice.” See P.C.I.J. ADVISORY COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 108,
at 322–23. Fernandes’s view supplements Descamps’s since he said that a sentence based on
principles was generally more just because they were based on justice, whereas strict law
often departed from it. Id. at 345–46.
145
Id. at 323–24.
146
Id.
144
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The scope and level of representation at an international conference also
delineates the applicable boundary of the conference outcome. Above all, it
binds participant countries in one way or another.147 In the preparatory
process to produce the zero draft, countries are allowed to submit a position
that has materialized the will of their respective constituencies.148 The
countries continue striving to embody and retain policies and priorities
contained in their position throughout the process of negotiations until the
conference officially adopts the final outcome.149 Hence, participant
countries are generally bound by this outcome insofar as they are bound by
the will of their people that drove them to be part of the proceedings. It also
means that there would not be critical reasons or incentives in most of the
cases in which a country should violate or be unwilling to be in compliance
with what it agreed. Turning to the international dimension, it is generally
expected in international relations that a state should not contradict its verbal
or behavioral commitment. The basic responsibility of estoppel is very
important and realistic if the state wishes to be treated as a faithful partner by
other members of the international community.
With this backdrop, consent is a critical foundation for better arbitration
among sovereign states in an international legal system today. Once states
concede in an international conference to adopt outcome principles, they
formally carry normative significance at the international level. Even if the
outcome principles do not exactly reflect each and every detail of national
policies and priorities, state compliance is required and the burden to further
communicate with and persuade its people to mitigate any differences lies
with the government that conceded the outcome, except when corruption or
other unfair practices were involved in the conference proceedings. This is
also true even if a country in question objected to some of the adopted
principles in the phases of negotiation. With an aim to restrict the
applicability of a particular principle after the conference, the delegation
usually delivers a statement at some point during the proceedings—even
through EOV after adopting the outcome—that it does not consent to or has
reservations about the principle. However, if the country never plans to
accept the proposed principle, it does not simply drop out with such
discontent or reservation. Instead, the country would obstruct the inclusion
of the principle in the outcome or revise the contents through consultations
or other diplomatic measures, or simply by stubborn and persistent
objections, during the preparatory and actual proceedings of the conference.
147
148
149

Id. at 344.
Id. at 345–46.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 18232.
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Such practices are possible, particularly when the conference favors
consensus as a rule of procedure to adopt the outcome, which is often the
case with most of the important international norm-setting conferences.150
Under the consensus rule, it is indeed possible to prohibit a particular
term, phrase or sentence from being included in the outcome of the
conference. Even a single country may deter unwarranted language if it feels
it truly must do so. This is not just a theoretical possibility. The UN was
established as a post-war international system to deter additional world wars
and the founders believed that respect for sovereign equality was the basis of
the organization.151 By definition, consensus means the meeting of minds of
all countries participating in the negotiation, and in determining whether they
reach a consensus, the sovereign equality of all members of the UN applies.
Therefore, a strong country could not prevent a weak one from raising an
objection with which to obstruct consensus. In the age of the Cold War, the
pressure exercised within an ideological group of states was powerful, but it
is no longer effective some time after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in
1989.152 Furthermore, from the mid-2000s on, the world’s power dynamics
have been changed and the leadership assumed by a “single superpower” has
been shared by other diversified groups, which greatly affected the way
negotiations are conducted inside the UN.153 Most of the recent General
Assembly resolutions were adopted by consensus whereas around 40%–70%
(depending on the year in question) were adopted by voting until the
1980s.154 Particularly in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General
Assembly today it is hard to find exceptions to this practice. As a result, for
instance, during meetings held in the 70th session of the General Assembly
to examine the agenda items to grant observer status to applicant

150
In advance of decisions, a country has to undergo a cost-benefit analysis between the
national interest in dropping a specific proposal and competing foreign relations interests with
its proponents and/or supporters.
151
U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶¶ 1–3.
152
But see Louis B. Sohn, United Nations Decision-Making: Confrontation or Consensus?,
15 HARV. INT’L L. J. 438, 444 (1974) (“A closer look at [U.N.] records makes it quite clear,
then, that despite verbal pyrotechnics, often emphasized by the information media, the work
of the [U.N.] proceeds quite smoothly, most decisions being adopted by unanimity or quasiunanimity. Consensus has in fact replaced confrontation.”).
153
See generally Erik Voeten, Resisting the Lonely Superpower: Responses of States in the
United Nations to U.S. Dominance, 66 J. INT’L POLITICS 729 (2004); see also United Nations
Programme No. 934, The UN Security Council – from the Cold War to the 21st Century, U.N.
WORLD CHRONICLE (Mar. 30, 2004), moderated by Tony Jenkins (transcript available at http://
www.un.org/webcast/worldchron/trans934.pdf).
154
Compare chronologically the voting records of the resolutions adopted by the UN
General Assembly at http://research.un.org/en/docs/ga.
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organizations, three among seven applications could not go through because
of the objection raised by one or two countries.155
Another reason a country would rather exclude language it opposes from
the outcome is that the records of objection or reservation only appear in the
report of the conference at best and may not become part of the outcome
document itself. Consequently, they do not have a clear legal status, nor are
they visible as in the adoption and ratification of a treaty, in which case a
reservation, declaration, understanding, interpretative statement, etc. are
officially attached to partly exclude or modify the legal effect of the treaty.156
In other words, there is no legitimate ground for non-compliance given to a
country that made objections or reservations to a proposal but ultimately
agreed to include that proposal in the final outcome. In most cases,
therefore, a state blocks all that it cannot take, allowing only what it finds
acceptable to survive in the outcome text.157
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, one of the recent
declaratory instruments, is a good example. Before its final adoption in
2007, the Declaration had a pre-history of negotiations, longer than that of
many treaties. Negotiations on the Declaration were first started by the
Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1982. The UN Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) established the working group, instigated by a
report titled “Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous
Populations” by José R. Martínez Cobo, Special Rapporteur of the SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
drafted.158 However, twenty-five years’ discussion could not clear all
obstacles. The African Group led by Namibia raised their voice in 2006 in
the form of an aide-mémoire several months after the text of the declaration
was first adopted in the Human Rights Council.159 They argued that the
Declaration should be adjusted to reflect African concerns before the General
155

U.N. GAOR 71st Sess. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/70/SR.10, 11, 16, 24, 27, 29 (see the summary
records of the meetings of the 6th Committee of the UN General Assembly for the agenda
items 168 to 174.)
156
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 94, arts. 19–23.
157
Of course, there are cases in which states neglect to take action or allow negotiations to
run their own course, due to lack of resources and capacity, or simply incidentally. However,
such mistakes are not only found in negotiations for soft law text, but would also happen in
the treaty-making process.
158
José R. Martínez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities (1986), http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/354767.
159
Draft Aid Memoire on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People,
AFRICAN GROUP, ¶ 9.2 (Nov. 9, 2006), http://www.iwgia.org/images/stories/int-processeseng/decl-rights-ind-peop/docs/AfricanGroupAideMemoireOnDeclaration.pdf [hereinafter Draft
Aid Memoire].
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Assembly adopted it.160 In the face of their hesitation, African delegations
were advised that the Declaration was not a legally binding document and a
state could just choose to ignore it.161 However, the African Delegations
famously replied that a declaration had been more than a non-binding
political document:
[F]or the common people in the street of Africa, there is no
difference between a politically non-binding [d]eclaration and a
[t]reaty. What is important to them would be the fact that
Governments or the United Nations have committed
themselves to specific actions.162
The delegation also argued that the Declaration might form part of
international customary law in the foreseeable future.163 As a result, they
concluded that “it would be inappropriate to adopt the Declaration with its
shortcomings simply because it is considered to be a declaration and
therefore not legally binding.”164 The memo further suggested, “If it is
envisaged that there would be legal and constitutional implications arising
from the adoption of the Declaration then the time to address such matters is
before and not after adoption.”165 For these reasons, African countries
requested more time to review the text,166 which the General Assembly
approved by its resolution, and one more year must pass before the
declaration is adopted.167
It is also interesting to see the record of objection raised by the Member
States of the UN during the prolonged negotiations. Some of their
complaints were premised on the assumption that the Declaration might put
their governments under legal obligations in conflict with existing domestic
laws or treaties. States which did not live up to the wording of the
Declaration would be “doing more than simply neglecting a political
statement.”168 While there were attempts to register an understanding that
160

Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id. ¶ 9.3.
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Id.
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Id.
166
Id. ¶ 9.4.
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Rachel Murray, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa: The
Approach of the Regional Organizations to Indigenous Peoples, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UN
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 485, 502–04 (Stephen Allen &
Alexandra Xanthaki eds., Hart Pub. Ltd. 2011).
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Id. at 503.
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the declaration was not a legally binding instrument, many more participants
were ambivalent about the legal status of the declaration:
The Declaration is explained by its supporters as being an
aspirational document intended to inspire rather than to have
legal effect. New Zealand does not, however, accept that a
State can responsibly take such a stance towards a document
that purports to declare the contents of the rights of indigenous
people. We take the statements in the Declaration very
seriously. For that reason we have felt compelled to take the
position that we do.169
Immediately after the adoption, their worries turned out to be real. The
Supreme Court of Belize delivered a judgment months later with its
interpretation that the Declaration contained the “principles of general
international law,” and was thereby legally binding.170
As a consequence of such a process, what is included in the outcome
document may represent the greatest common denominator of participants in
the conference. It is not unusual that the majority of state participants show
compliance with the principles once adopted in an international conference.
Perhaps, it is the true meaning of Louis Henkin’s brilliant observation that
“[i]t is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles
of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the
time.”171
D. Conditions to Make Principles International Law
What would be the meaning of this legislative process, which is serious
enough and thus likely to grant legal status to declared outcome principles?
Thus far, a thesis may be put forth that principles produced by the major UN
environmental conferences can be law insofar as principles as an
international law source are law. This is because offenses and defenses for
the two instruments are alike, as was evidenced by the analyses of their
context, jurisprudential nature, textual similarity, drafters’ intention, and

169

U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mrg. at 14–15, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107.
Aurelio Cal et al. v. Attorney General of Belize & Minister of Natural Resources and
Environment (Maya Village Cases), Supreme Court of Belize Claim No. 171, 172, at 63 ¶ 131
(Oct. 18, 2007).
171
LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 42 (Frederick A.
Praeger, Publishers 1968); see generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599–2659 (1997).
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subsequent practices. The legislative process surrounding the major UN
environmental conferences may add value to these comparative analyses
between outcome principles (conventionally recognized as a soft law) and
principles under the ICJ Statute (conventionally recognized as an
international law), demonstrating procedural safeguards to find outcome
principles as a source of international law. To evaluate the impact of this
norm-making process in the historic UN environmental conferences on the
legal status of principles, it may be helpful to refer to H.L.A. Hart’s theory
on the concept of law.172 He explains law as a union between two types of
rules—the primary and secondary rules.173 The former directly govern
conduct and the latter create, alter, or repeal the former.174 Among the
secondary rules, he thought that what is called “the rule of recognition” was
essential in differentiating norms that have the authority of law from those
that do not.175 For Hart, the status of a norm builds largely upon this rule,
and therefore it will enable us to discern whether a principle is indeed law.176
Some argue that the rule of recognition as a criteria used to identify which
norms are law is already integrated in the format of the instrument where a
norm in question is found.177 The legal status of a principle depends upon its
container because it characterizes what kind of recognition that the principle
receives. For instance, if the container is a treaty ratified between states, it is
probable that the norms established by that treaty are law. However, apart
from the irony that a treaty could not bind state parties in practice on many
occasions, not all treaty norms are in theory law. A treaty consists not only
of legal provisions but also of simple statements of facts, aspirational
language, as well as a weak form of recommendations that do not necessarily
serve the binding character of the treaty. The same logic is applicable to
softer instruments. They may comprehend law as well as non-law regardless
of their formats. In the case of an international environmental conference, an
advance decision has been made to provide the direction of the preparatory
process for the conference as well as the format of draft outcome(s) of that
conference. However, it does not at all have the full control over what kind
of norms are ultimately to be included in the outcome.
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Payandeh, supra note 81.
Murphy, supra note 82, at 168–69.
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Id.
175
Id.
176
It also needs to be noted that this theory does not distinguish soft law principles from
international law principles. It evaluates the legal status of principles themselves.
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Stephen V. Carey, Comment, What is the Rule of Recognition in the United States?, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2009).
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That is why Hart himself made an exception later that a norm can be
qualified as international law in the absence of the rule of recognition.178 His
exception at least implies the possibility that when a container instrument is
hard, some of its content remain non-law. Or, while the container is soft, its
content can nonetheless stand as law. However, if Hart were to examine the
processes of norm making in all major UN environmental conferences up
until today, he might have wanted to revise his theory to properly count them
as a “rule of recognition in international law.” In the revised theory, his
main concept is still valid insofar that being law entails an expectation of
compliance where agreed norms will be followed. But this expectation is
now guaranteed by some sort of sound and dense social mechanisms
comprising the newly evolving international legislative process that exercises
a sufficient amount of pressure for observances and against violations.179
This is not merely about the vague language of “moral right or wrong, good
or bad” testing the substance of a norm.180 It describes a discernible rule
based on particular social constructs embedded in the norm-making process
of the monumental UN environmental conferences where the highest-level
participants are well aware that they are discussing what norms they should
reflect in their behavior in international spheres and follow in policy-making
at the domestic level. With such rules of recognition, there is a high
probability that these principles are indeed law.
According to the established practice at UN conferences, rules necessary
to recognize a norm as law can be satisfied particularly when a large number
of the heads of state and government adopt a set of norms with pledges to
commit to implementing the norms. Those states or governments ought to be
bound, in most circumstances, by what their highest representatives adopted
and pledged. Of course, there might be cases of weaker observance or noncompliance, but they are not likely to happen more often than in the
application of other hard international law sources. The UN General
Assembly expressly determined that the format of the outcome of Rio+20 be
a concise political document.181 However, the legal status of the Rio+20
outcome went beyond this formal rule of drafting. The outcome document
contained principles with legal significance as a response to the evolving
context and persistent environmental problems therein.182 It is the same with
178

Murphy, supra note 82, at 168.
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 232–237 (2d ed., Clarendon Press 1994) (1961).
180
Murphy, supra note 82, at 168.
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G.A. Res. 64/236, supra note 16, para. 20(b).
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U.N. Dep’t of Pub. Info., Rio+20 in Numbers, U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS
(June 23, 2012), http://www.uncsd2012.org/index.php?page=view&nr=1304&type=230&me
nu=38.
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other seminal UN environmental conferences.
Conferences brought
hundreds of heads of state or government and 500 ministers from almost all
countries. During the proceedings, their firm will was stated to make the
outcome principles the norms governing these environmental problems, and
so was their promise to be in compliance with the principles even without
textual guarantees to punish non-compliance.
While the international community still does not have—and
likely never will have—a global legislature, court, and police
force, it does have a rather striking array of ways in which rules
are made, interpreted, monitored, and complied with,
suggesting the presence of a system of “law,” albeit an unusual
one.183
In addition to the scope and level of participation, the modus operandi of
the preparation for the conference and the actual conference proceedings is
also important. There should be a sufficient period of serious negotiations,
during which fair working methods to reach a consensus must be applied.
The major UN environmental conferences spent approximately two years
before presenting the final draft outcome to the conference. As explained,
this excludes the period of preliminary steps to raise international public
awareness and trigger the relevant General Assembly procedure.
Furthermore, keen interest on the part of participating countries and the
international community as a whole has to be demonstrated.184 In both the
Johannesburg Summit and the Sustainable Development Summit, for
example, many governments competitively proposed their plans and
promises to enhance sustainable development strategies. Zeal for promoting
the green economy was very strong in Rio+20 following the memorable
economic recession that occurred right before the initiation of its preparatory
process. Indeed the will of members of the international community has
greatly affected the normative status of legal instruments at the time.
Besides these special characteristics of the legislative process, follow-up
measures by international organizations and conference participants are other
factors that determines whether the outcome principles are indeed a source of
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Murphy, supra note 82, at 169.
Mainly due to resource constraints, major UN conferences themselves are planned when
there are both compelling needs for norm-making and expectations in the international
community for a significant outcome.
184
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international law.185 Since the aftermath of the Stockholm Conference, the
UN Secretariat and the Member States have launched new organizational
bodies, operated monitoring mechanisms, and convened relevant
international meetings according to the outcomes, as well as reaffirmed the
principles by future conferences.186 These four parameters can always be
seen to govern a global agenda in the context of international norm-making,
and they interact and interfuse one another closely to the extent that separate
identification is often less useful. For instance, the scope and level of
participation in a conference is one reliable indicator for strong interest
behind outcome principles and perhaps for a solid modus operandi applied
throughout the whole process to get the outcome principles. Most likely, it
may also result in sincere follow-up measures.
This rule of recognition is premised on the same norm-making
environment for hard and soft international laws and applies equally in
evaluating the legal status of both kinds of principles. Thus, the scope and
level of participation in the conference, the sincerity of the proceedings, the
interest of participants, and the effectiveness of follow-ups; all are part and
parcel of a possible rule of recognition in international law that Hart today
185

Consideration of any subsequent practice is part of the general rule of interpretation of a
treaty per Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 94, art. 31(3)(b).
186
After the General Assembly approved or endorsed the outcomes of the Stockholm and
Rio Conferences, for instance, the UN Secretariat underwent significant structural reforms,
including the creation of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Commission on
Sustainable Development. The Secretariat also provided various services to effectively
manage new or reformed forums. When Rio+20 envisioned in its outcome an expansion of
membership in the UNEP Governing Council into a universal one, UNEP started providing
services for this new forum later called the “World Environmental Congress” to accomplish
this goal. It is noteworthy that there was no objection by the participating States to establish
forums or expand membership according to relevant paragraphs of the outcome document,
even though under traditional international legal theories they were only recommendatory in
nature rather than obligatory. See The Future We Want, supra note 64, para. 88; see also U.N.
Environment Assembly, U.N. Environment Programme, http://www.unep.org/unea/about.asp.
Paragraph 162 of the Rio+20 outcome document further states that participating states
“commit to address, on an urgent basis, the issue of the conservation and sustainable use of
marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction, including by taking a
decision on the development of an international instrument under the Convention on the Law
of the Sea.” The member states followed this guideline and actually took the requested
decision. Although substantively there were severe confrontations on many issues due to
diametrically different positions among States Parties to UNCLOS, no delegation contended
that it need not implement what had been addressed in the Rio+20 outcome because it was
merely a declaration, and legally speaking, not binding. See generally G.A. Res. 69/292,
Development of an international legally binding instrument under United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity
of areas beyond national jurisdiction (June 19, 2015).

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

HOW DID THEY BECOME LAW?

5/17/2017 2:58 PM

95

may approve as necessary to determine and constitute the ultimate legal
status of any outcome. The theory of these novel attributes attached to the
rule of recognition in international law also reinforces the previous
conclusion that a certain type of recognition by the international community
is constitutive in making principles an effective source of international
law.187 This is precisely what Article 38(1)(c) means when it enlists “general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” and how soft law
principles may well become recognized as a source of international law.
Therefore, it is highly probable that principles, whether contained within a
soft-law or hard-law instrument, are a source of international law if the
adoption of those principles underwent a sufficient period of serious
negotiations that took place under fair working methods, attracted universal
and high-level participation with will and interest, including in particular in
the actual conference for their adoption, and took measures for the
implementation of the principles in the adopted outcome.
If a set of principles meet the aforementioned four conditions, it means
that they are substantively paramount to legally govern a field of
international concern and thus may well fall in the category of the third
source of international law under the ICJ Statute. Moreover, it should also
mean that their applicable boundary extends beyond the list of state
participants who drafted and adopted the principles. As seen thus far, it is
probable that when such principles have been recognized by most countries,
we may call them the general principles of law that the ICJ, one of the most
authoritative international courts at the present time shall apply.188
Ultimately, the principles that acquired designation as international law are
applicable not only to the participant states in the conference, but also to
other members of the international community. In this way, the principles
declared by consensus in the monumental UN environmental conferences

187

See P.C.I.J. ADVISORY COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 108, at 215 (noting
Fernandes’s statements).
188
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is different from Article
38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The PCIJ Statute only
prescribes that the Court shall apply the four sources listed in its Article 38 and does not
specify their legal character. The ICJ Statute, however, adds a new parenthesis to explain the
function of the court and in doing so clarifies the legal character of the four sources listed in
its Article 38(1). By applying them, the court is to decide a case a new “in accordance with
international law.” It means that the ICJ Statute recognizes that they are the sources of
international law, one of which is the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.
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carry great legal significance in international law and governance, affecting
all states.189
V. CONCLUSION
At the start of this inquiry, we saw in a memorandum drafted by the UN
Office of Legal Affairs that the declaration, a formal and representative softlaw instrument, acquires normative power by enunciating principles of great
and lasting importance.190 In response to the criticism that “[w]here there is
no law, the strong make the law,”191 the drafters of the PCIJ replied in
defense of principles as a solid source of international law that such an era
had already passed. Nonetheless, they had to suffer another world war.
Interestingly, the drafters of the ICJ Statute again accepted this controversial
provision without further discussion. The interwar period was one in
desperate need of “a co-ordinated [sic] system based on principles of justice
in international affairs” replacing “the inevitably unreliable system of the
balance of power.”192 Whether this era has fully receded into history may
still be an important question to address as we commemorate seventy years
since the UN was founded at the end of World War II.193
Principles as a source of international law, which many mistakenly
understood to be restricted to bind states only with the most foundational
legal axioms common to all domestic law systems, were a more creative
device designed to avoid the denial of a trial being non liquet and pursue
justice in situations where a treaty or custom could not govern. To fulfill this
aim, the principles should at least be those that are recognized by the legal
conscience of civilized nations or refined consistent with international public
opinion. However, this does not lead to a prejudged affirmation that only a
very small number of principles deserve to be the source of international law.
International environmental law is an area of law that began developing
relatively late in the 1960s. As environmental consciousness and awareness
grew in the international community, the UN convened several large-scale
high-level summits that proposed to the world the basic principles of
international environmental law. Increasingly, a considerable portion of
189

The UN Secretariat is most likely to abide by declarations adopted at the UN forums. Its
compliant actions often lead to compliance by Member States and affect the implementation
of global agendas in international relations as intended by the conferences, thereby effectively
serving governance of the target field.
190
Shelton, supra note 33, at 70.
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P.C.I.J. ADVISORY COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 108, at 320.
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P. Van Dijk, Equity: A Recognized Manifestation of International Law?, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ITS SOURCES 7 (1989).
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P.C.I.J. ADVISORY COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 108, at 324.
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those principles are put forth to form the body of the source of international
law; the rest are fast evolving towards the same end. Still, there are not
many court decisions that applied these principles and their reflection in the
harder instruments such as treaties or customs is in its initial stages.
Nonetheless, the principles produced throughout the UN environmental
conferences are significantly influencing the development of international
environmental law.
Whether the whole or part are acknowledged as a source of international
law in the meaning of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute—as I argue more should
be in this Article—these principles will continue to steer the future direction
of international environmental law, which will ultimately coincide with their
evolutionary path. In addition, at the increasing speed that the soft law
hardens, these environmental principles will possibly be consolidated in the
form of treaties and customs. We are once again resorting to principles,
faced with an unprecedented challenge to regulate global environmental
issues and associated phenomena through law and justice, like the creators of
the PCIJ who dreamed of peace at the end of World War I. It is my sincere
hope that this time the expansion of the normative value of principles leads
to a true transnational rule of law that can successfully govern the world’s
environment as it stands on a precipice.

